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4 Distributing scarce adaptation finance across 
SIDS: effectiveness, not efficiency 
Christian Baatz and Michel Bourban 
Although Small Island Developing States (SIDS) receive high amounts of adapta-
tion finance on a per capita basis, current and expected funding is much lower than 
present and future adaptation costs. Since funding is insufficient to cover all needs, 
adaptation finance ought to benefit those who are most entitled to the funding. 
These entitlements can be determined via prioritisation criteria. Vulnerability is the 
most prominent prioritisation criterion but must be supplemented with further 
criteria because of its shortcomings. In this contribution we thus investigate 
whether cost-effectiveness and democracy should play this role. To this end, we 
first discuss Stadelmann and colleagues’ proposal to operationalise the cost-
effectiveness criterion via three indicators (absolute economic savings, relative 
economic savings, and avoided loss of Disability Adjusted Life Years). We argue 
that this set of indicators fails to capture important adaptation benefits and may 
reinforce the current bias towards hard adaptation measures. We further claim that 
one should ‘just’ focus on safeguarding effective, that is successful, adaptation 
instead. To that effect, we propose ‘democracy’ as an alternative to cost-
effectiveness. We first justify the criterion by providing intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons in its defence and, second, discuss how to operationalise it, using the ex-
ample of SIDS. We conclude that although also challenging, democracy is less 
difficult to operationalise than cost-effectiveness. 
Cite this article: Baatz, M. & Bourban, M. (2019): Distributing scarce adaptation finance across 
SIDS: effectiveness, not efficiency. In: Klöck, C. & Fink, M. (eds.): Dealing with climate change 
on small islands: towards effective and sustainable adaptation? (pp. 77–99). Göttingen: Göttingen 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.17875/gup2019-1212 
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1 Introduction 
While Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are not a homogeneous political, 
social, or cultural group, they share common characteristics that distinguish them 
as highly vulnerable to climate change, such as smallness, isolation, and remote-
ness. All SIDS are exposed to severe climate impacts, such as sea-level rise, strong-
er and more frequent storms, coastal erosion, cyclones, and changing rainfall pat-
terns, and thus face high relative adaptation costs (Nurse et al., 2014). For instance, 
the costs of shore protection works aimed at reducing the adverse effects of sea-
level rise in small islands is substantially higher in terms of both per capita and 
percentage of GDP than the costs of similar structures in larger territories with 
larger populations and higher levels of gross national income per capita (Nurse et 
al., 2014). 
Many SIDS use international adaptation financing to meet adaptation costs and 
ease domestic constraints. Between 2003 and 2017, multilateral climate funds pro-
vided US$ 1,380 million to the 38 UN member SIDS for 210 projects of both 
mitigation and adaptation. Approximately 56% of climate finance has contributed 
to adaptation efforts, 25% has contributed to mitigation, 3% has contributed to 
REDD projects, and 16% has had multiple foci (Watson, Bird, Schalatek, & Keil, 
2017). To date, most adaptation finance has been provided through bilateral chan-
nels. Between 2010 and 2014, OECD countries self-reported committing an esti-
mated US$ 2 billion in adaptation finance to all 58 countries classified as SIDS, 
51% of which went to Cabo Verde, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guyana, and Ti-
mor-Leste (Robinson & Dornan, 2017). On a per capita basis, SIDS were among 
the largest recipients of adaptation aid between 2010 and 2015 (Betzold & Weiler, 
2018, p. 116). However, it is difficult to measure aggregate flows of international 
adaptation finance. Even though OECD countries claim that US$ 10.1 billion of 
bilateral aid was adaptation-related in 2012, Weikmans and colleagues (2017, p. 
466) conclude that only US$ 2.35 billion appeared to be genuinely adaptation-
related, and that only US$ 1.2 billion seemed to have targeted adaptation as a prin-
cipal objective. 1 
Still, despite growing and substantial (self-reported) adaptation finance flows to 
SIDS, they cover only a small part of actual adaptation needs (Watson et al., 2017, 
p. 1). In such a context of scarcity, finance should benefit those who are most 
entitled to the funding. These people can be determined, in principle at least, via 
so-called prioritisation criteria.  
Vulnerability is the most prominent criterion in both political and academic 
debates. Scholars agree that adaptation finance ought to benefit those who are 
                                                     
1 These significant differences are mainly a result of the over-coding of adaptation-relevant projects 
by donor countries, a problem caused by the absence of independent quality control in the Rio mark-
er reporting system, a lack of clarity within aid agencies about the distinction between climate change 
adaptation and other types of environmental projects, and the pressure on developed countries to 
show that they are taking action on climate adaptation (Weikman et al., 2017, pp. 467–468). 
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most vulnerable to climate change (e.g. Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2012, p. 60) and 
all major United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
agreements have restated this principle (see Klein & Möhner, 2011, pp. 16–17). 
Yet, as Pickering (2012, p. 5) states, “broad agreement on this issue masks two 
important areas of disagreement, namely how vulnerability should be conceived 
and measured, and whether (and which) other principles could also inform priori-
tization”.  
While SIDS have been recognised as ‘particularly vulnerable’ throughout the 
history of climate negotiations, from the UNFCCC to the Paris Agreement 
(Weikmans, 2016, pp. 5–7), this category is very broad. There is no consensus on 
the list of countries that should be classified as ‘highly vulnerable’ (Weikmans, 
2016, p. 7). And even among SIDS, vulnerability varies considerably both between 
and within countries, as a result of geographical, social, and political factors 
(Sjöstedt & Povitkina, 2017). For instance, SIDS include both least developed 
countries like Comoros and Tuvalu and high-income countries like Singapore, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Bahamas. 
Treating SIDS as a group with homogeneous entitlements therefore does not 
make much sense. A more refined approach is necessary and several studies have 
developed complex, aggregate global vulnerability indices (e.g. Barr, Fankhauser, & 
Hamilton, 2010; Chen et al., 2015). However, “the rankings of countries yielded by 
the various indicators diverge greatly” (Mathy & Blanchard, 2015, p. 757), “there is 
no agreed way of assessing […] and comparing the vulnerability of countries” 
(Klein & Möhner, 2011, p. 16) and “all attempts to allocate adaptation funding 
based on aggregate national-level indices of vulnerability to climate change have 
been deeply unsatisfying” (Füssel, Hallegatte, & Reder, 2012, p. 323).2 This may 
not come as a surprise since data aggregation requires a lot of empirical and nor-
mative assumptions, some of which are rather controversial. As long as no agreed 
methodology exists, aggregating many heterodox factors that influence vulnerabil-
ity into a single number will “not reveal more but rather disguise[s] what is known” 
(Hinkel, 2011, p. 205). Therefore, basing the prioritisation of adaptation finance on 
such an index-based vulnerability ranking is too arbitrary and not a reasonable 
option (Barr et al., 2010, pp. 845–846; Füssel, 2010, p. 608; Hinkel, 2011, p. 206). 
If vulnerability should not be the sole, and perhaps not even the main, prioriti-
sation criterion, distributing funding on the basis of the (expected) benefits of 
different adaptive measures might be a reasonable complementary criterion. In this 
regard, Stadelmann and colleagues (2014, 2015) propose different cost-
effectiveness indicators that enable such comparisons. Since we dispute that using 
these indicators as universal metrics in the prioritisation of adaptation finance is 
desirable and think that alternative indicators for cost-effectiveness would face 
similar problems, we propose ‘democracy’ as a better complementary criterion to 
                                                     
2 The verdict also holds for more recent studies (Baatz, 2017). 
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vulnerability to check whether conditions exist that allow for desirable adaptation 
processes and outcomes. 
All three criteria already seem to play some role in the distribution of interna-
tional funding in practice. Countries that are more vulnerable to climate change tend 
to receive more bilateral adaptation finance, at least if the physical components of 
vulnerability, that is exposure and sensitivity to climate risks, are measured (Bet-
zold & Weiler, 2018, p. 166). Since vulnerability is also influenced by social factors 
determining people’s adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2014, p. 21), a distribution accord-
ing to physical vulnerability may not prioritise the most vulnerable, all things con-
sidered. Bilateral donors also tend to give more adaptation finance to better gov-
erned countries, since they are perceived as better able to use resources in an effec-
tive and efficient manner (Betzold & Weiler, 2018, p. 116). Thus, (perceived) effi-
ciency, i.e. cost-effectiveness, seems to influence funding decisions but is not used 
as a discrete allocation criterion. The level of democracy, on the other hand, is posi-
tively correlated with the amount of foreign aid a country receives (e.g. Dollar & 
Levin, 2006). Similarly, well-governed countries are substantially more likely to 
receive adaptation finance and to receive higher levels of adaptation aid per capita 
(Weiler, Klöck, & Dornan, 2018, p. 74). The notion of good governance and how 
it is measured by Weiler and colleagues, however, includes aspects that go beyond 
democracy (e.g. whether regulation enables growth), and the robustness of the 
indices usually employed to measure democracy has been questioned (e.g. Thomas, 
2010). It is therefore likely that democracy positively affects funding levels.  
This chapter does not investigate whether and how these criteria are used, but 
aims at answering the normative question of whether cost-effectiveness and de-
mocracy should guide the distribution of scarce funding in the context of adapta-
tion. We proceed as follows: Section 2 critically discusses Stadelmann and col-
leagues’ proposal; Section 3 briefly argues that, instead, criteria and related indica-
tors should show to what extent conditions allowing for effective adaptation pre-
vail; Section 4 develops our proposal for a democracy criterion; and Section 5 
summarises key findings. 
2 Cost-effectiveness as a (further) prioritisation criterion? 
Generally, adaptation funding should be effective, i.e. reach its desired goal(s). In 
human systems, the goal of adaptation is to reduce current and expected climate-
induced harms (Field et al., 2014, p. 40; Hartzell-Nichols, 2011).3 Reducing harm is 
a very general goal when it comes to adaptation finance. Given scarce funding, 
among other things, a reasonable aim of international adaptation finance is not so 
                                                     
3 The IPCC adds that adaptation also aims at exploiting beneficial opportunities (Field et al., 2014, p. 
40). As the goal of adaptation finance should be minimising or avoiding net harm, we ignore this 
aspect. 
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much to reduce – and ideally avoid – any kind of harm, but to minimise serious 
harm. 
In order to determine which harm should count as ‘serious’, a normative theo-
ry is required. In line with previous works we adopt a human rights framework 
according to which all human beings have certain rights, as for example those laid 
down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Everybody is bound 
by these rights and the associated duties not to violate them, to contribute to pro-
tecting them, and to aid those deprived of their rights (Shue, 1980). On this ac-
count, all those harms are serious that undermine people’s ability to exercise their 
human rights.4 The account offers a sufficientarian threshold of what people are 
entitled to as a matter of justice. People may be entitled to more in terms of global 
justice (i.e. what people from everywhere owe them) and to much more in terms of 
national justice (i.e. what they are owed by fellow citizens). As citizens of country 
X they may be entitled to basic income, education, health services, and so on that 
go (far) beyond what is established by this human rights account. We adopt a less 
demanding standard to avoid controversial but unnecessary assumptions.  
There is a broad agreement in the literature that climate change will undermine 
and is already undermining the exercise of several internationally protected human 
rights, such as the right to life, to an adequate standard of health, to the means for 
subsistence, and to shelter and property – and this also holds for inhabitants of 
SIDS (Humphreys, 2010). Adaptation aims at maintaining or restoring the condi-
tions under which people can exercise these rights in the face of climate change 
threats (for detail see Baatz, 2017, as well as Caney, 2012). This goal can be reached 
to varying degrees. If funding is insufficient to protect the human rights of all peo-
ple foreseeably threatened by climate change, it seems reasonable to support those 
measures that best protect human rights: that is, which protect as many people as 
possible for a given amount of funding. Put in more general terms, those measures 
should be funded that are most efficient or cost-effective. Cost-effectiveness is a 
term prominently used in health care and denotes the measures that achieve the 
greatest improvement in health for a given amount of resources (World Health 
Organization, 2019). Here, cost-effectiveness analysis aims at identifying projects 
that deliver the greatest adaptation benefit, in terms of human rights protected, for 
a given amount of funding.   
As with vulnerability, cost-effectiveness must be ‘measured’ or specified to 
guide funding decisions. To compare adaptation benefits across projects, 
Stadelmann  and colleagues (2014, 2015) propose corresponding indicators. They 
argue that what is ultimately of interest is not the output or outcome (e.g. trained 
people or built dams) but the impact of a given adaptation project (Stadelmann, 
Persson, Ratajczak-Juszko, & Michaelowa, 2014, p. 110). But the impacts of a pro-
ject are hard to predict, especially for soft and flexible measures as well as for those 
                                                     
4 Alternatively, one could adopt the capabilities approach (see e.g. Schlosberg, 2012; Govind, 2013; 
Shockley, 2014). This does not affect our argument below that the diverse nature of adaptation bene-
fits heavily complicates measuring and comparing the cost-effectiveness of adaption projects. 
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that support basic development. Moreover, even if it were possible to predict the 
likely effects, accurately measuring these effects in a way that makes them compa-
rable across projects and regions would remain a major challenge (Stadelmann et 
al., 2014, p. 108).  
Faced with these problems, Stadelmann and colleagues (2014, p. 110) “rely on 
a set of three indicators that try to proxy cost-effectiveness: absolute economic 
savings, relative economic savings, and human lives saved per USD of spending”. 
The absolute economic savings indicator is defined as the monetised assets saved 
by adaptation. Since it ignores non-monetised benefits and favours wealthy people 
and regions over poor ones, the authors use two additional indicators (Stadelmann 
et al., 2014, p. 110). Relative economic savings “are defined as the percentage of 
annual income saved, multiplied with the number of beneficiaries. […] Human 
lives savings are measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years Saved (DALYs) [sic], 
an indicator systematically utilized by the World Health Organization” (Stadelmann 
et al., 2014, p. 111). The authors aim at avoiding a “monetary-only approach” 
while at the same time allowing for universal comparisons of projects, i.e. across 
different areas, that are not possible so far because existing approaches only work 
within areas or sectors (Stadelmann, Michaelowa, Butzengeiger-Geyer, & Köhler, 
2015, p. 2149). 
2.1 Absolute economic savings 
Despite the shortcomings of absolute economic savings measured via saved mone-
tised assets, the authors supplement rather than replace the indicator because “it is 
the usual way to measure macro-economic effectiveness, it is a standard indicator 
for evaluating the well-being of societies, it reflects overall utility as stated by mar-
ket participants” (Stadelmann et al., 2014, p. 111). The fact that something is rou-
tinely used is not a justification for using it as well and it has been doubted for 
quite some time that absolute economic savings or even economic savings is a 
good indicator of the wellbeing of societies or, rather, people (e.g. Sen, 1999).  
In the context of adaptation, the indicator is likewise problematic. The key ob-
jective of adaptation is to avoid serious harms caused by climatic changes; it pro-
tects what is of value against loss and damages and fulfils this function for people 
in very different situations. Where more valuable objects and opportunities exist, 
more can be lost. Therefore, more losses can be prevented by undertaking adapta-
tion where many objects and opportunities exist. If all of these objects and oppor-
tunities were of equal worth, it would make sense to favour measures that protect 
more of them, as argued above. However, absolute economic savings hardly meas-
ure equally valuable things. According to this indicator, a loss of US$ 100 for a 
member of the Singaporean elite and a subsistence farmer in the Comoros has the 
same weight (Stadelmann et al., 2014, p. 111). Moreover, while many fundamental 
losses are hardly captured by the measure (say, a person contracts dengue fever, 
does not receive medical treatment, and dies), comparatively trivial monetary losses 
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of affluent persons are fully accounted because they are reliably captured by this 
indicator.5   
2.2 Relative economic savings and DALYs 
There are different ways to adjust the economic savings indicator in order to 
dampen the bias in favour of wealthier people. The option suggested by 
Stadelmann and colleagues is measuring the percentage of annual income saved. 
The main drawback of the relative economic savings indicator (as percentage of 
annual income saved) is that it ignores all effects that are not income related. And 
while the protection of income is often very important, the adaptation literature 
stresses that vulnerability to climate change cannot be reduced to lack in income 
(Paavola & Adger, 2006, p. 605). Furthermore, the criterion ignores how the per-
son that loses (part of) her income is situated, that is, how wealthy/poor she is (see 
also Persson & Remling, 2014, p. 29). This is relevant for losing, say, 10% of one’s 
income might impose serious hardship on a poor person while it does not for a 
very wealthy member of society. Overall, the criterion is under- and over-inclusive: 
it does not capture human rights threats that are not related to income losses and 
captures income losses that are not related to human rights threats. An indicator 
that does not adequately capture whether adaptation is effective faces problems 
when comparing the cost-effectiveness of various projects.    
The under-inclusiveness of relative economic savings is reduced by adding the 
third indicator, DALYs lost, which is more directly related to human rights threats. 
A reduction in DALYs may indicate that the right to life and to an adequate stand-
ard of health care are temporarily or permanently undermined.6 In combination, 
DALYs and relative economic savings might better indicate threats to human 
rights. The remaining problem is that both indicators do not capture many effects 
that are highly relevant.  
We illustrate this point by drawing on the distinction between so-called hard 
and soft adaptation measures, referring to technology-driven infrastructure pro-
jects like dams or irrigation systems and to changes in planning, institutional set-
tings, and behaviour respectively (Fankhauser & Burton, 2011, p. 1045). While 
“there is a well-known and long-observed practice in adaptation studies to prefer 
hard […] over soft measures” (Fankhauser & Burton, 2011, p. 1045), the latter are 
at least as important as the former. Usually, non-climatic factors make people vul-
nerable to climate change: the “lack of social, political, and economic resources 
that poor and marginal communities fail to command is the main factor creating 
                                                     
5 It is noteworthy that, strictly speaking, human rights do not measure things of equal moral worth 
either, for one would probably say, for example, that the right to life is of greater importance than the 
right to establish unions. However, the problem of giving equal weight to unequal values is much 
graver in the case of economic savings. 
6 However, mild diseases will increase the number of DALYs but will not undermine the exercise of 
human rights. 
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their inability to cope with climatic changes” (Khan & Roberts, 2013, p. 183). Ac-
tivities that effectively reduce vulnerability (also) need to tackle these factors, and 
technology-based measures that address specific climate impacts are unable to do 
so (Roberts & Parks, 2007, p. 132; Klein & Persson, 2008, p. 40; Ayers & Dod-
man, 2010, p. 165). Effective adaptation often can be achieved by changes in prac-
tices, and when hard adaptation is effective it needs to be accompanied by design 
or regulatory, i.e. soft, measures (e.g. Fankhauser & Burton, 2011, p. 1045).  
Therefore, it is crucial to overcome the bias towards hard measures, but the 
indicators proposed by Stadelmann and colleagues may rather reinforce it. Consid-
er two examples: Protecting flood-prone shores of SIDS from inundation might 
allow for a straightforward calculation of losses prevented in the future. In com-
parison, a successful development policy, a reform of the schooling system, or a 
change in regulations may result in very beneficial developments in the long-run 
that are, at the same time, difficult to predict and to accurately calculate. It would 
be challenging, for example, to express the benefits of the schooling reform in 
terms of the avoided loss in DALYs or income. Using these indicators may thus 
favour hard over soft measures. 
The shortcomings of these cost-effectiveness indicators can also be illustrated 
by the serious non-economic losses inhabitants of SIDS are facing. Sea-level rise 
may force many people to leave their home, even their country. To the extent that 
people will be dispersed through various places willing to accept immigrants in a 
limited number, they face the threat of cultural and linguistic loss that can under-
mine the social bases of self-respect (Zellentin, 2015, pp. 496–497; see also Far-
botko, this volume). These as well as other non-economic losses and damages 
associated with ‘climate migration’ are not captured by the indicators. 
Stadelmann and colleagues highlight the major challenge of measuring adapta-
tion benefits in a way that makes them comparable across projects and regions. 
For the reasons just stated, we do not think that the indicators they propose  even 
come close to meeting the challenge because too many important effects are not 
captured by them. However, we acknowledge that any indicator will face this prob-
lem because the benefits of adaptation are highly diverse and cannot be captured 
with one or two indicators (see examples of economic, social, and environmental 
benefits provided in Remling & Persson, 2015, p. 27). We thus doubt that it makes 
sense to universally compare the cost-effectiveness of adaptation projects as this 
would require a host of different indicators that are based on incommensurable 
values as well as the quantification of effects that are both hard to predict and hard 
to measure.7 But note that our argument leaves the door open to use relative eco-
nomic savings and avoided DALYs losses8 for projects whose key aim is to protect 
                                                     
7 Scepticism regarding the usefulness of a cost-effectiveness criterion is also voiced by Paavola and 
Adger (2006, p. 605) and Persson et al. (2009, p. 89). 
8 In the context of public health and medical ethics, the DALYs approach faces severe criticism on 
both methodological and normative grounds (e.g. Daniels, 2008; Klonschinski, 2016). We deal with 
this critique in future work on the (non-)relevance of efficiency considerations in adaptation finance. 
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people’s income and health respectively. In this vein, it might make sense to com-
pare similar projects across regions/countries or different types of projects with 
the same aim in one region/country. 
3 Focusing on conditions for effective adaptation 
Given the difficulties of determining cost-effective measures in a reasonable way, 
we suggest using alternative criteria that focus on the more basic challenge: ensur-
ing that adaptation is effective at all. Due to the well-known barriers to adaptation,9 
achieving effectiveness is far from trivial. Effectiveness is determined not only by 
case-specific factors, such as project idea and design, but also by the capacity of 
regional or national authorities to implement effective adaptation projects (Persson 
& Remling, 2014, p. 494). For this reason, implementation capacity could serve as 
a general criterion to prioritise funding. But higher implementation capacity usually 
means better governance and higher adaptive capacity (Pickering, 2012, p. 5). Since 
adaptive capacity is a component of vulnerability, higher adaptation and implemen-
tation capacity means lower vulnerability. 
Faced with the trade-off between effectiveness (specified via implementation 
capacity) and vulnerability, Barr and colleagues (2010, p. 852) argue that low im-
plementation capacity should not be a reason to provide less funding to a country: 
“Insufficient implementation capacity may point to […] stricter monitoring ar-
rangements and a stronger role for development agencies in project management. 
It also points to a need for capacity building as an adaptation (and development) 
priority”. And “a more hands-on approach on project implementation may be 
required” in these cases (Barr et al., 2010, p. 854). Pickering (2012, p. 845) correctly 
stresses that “even ‘hands-on’ approaches may be insufficient to counter major 
obstacles to implementation such as civil conflict or entrenched corruption”.  
These considerations highlight that the reasons for low implementation capaci-
ties matter for funding decisions. If a country ‘merely’ lacks the bureaucratic appa-
ratus, the know-how to develop effective adaptation measures, and/or the capacity 
to absorb, manage, and distribute substantial amounts of international funding, 
capacity building indeed is the correct way forward. If, on the other hand, the main 
problem consists in, say, kleptocratic forms of government, supporting the en-
largement of the bureaucratic apparatus will most likely increase corruption levels 
and hardly benefit marginalised and vulnerable groups.  
Therefore, universal criteria should indicate whether the conditions that allow 
for effective adaptation are present or can be facilitated via the funding. The next 
section proposes ‘democracy’ as one possible criterion to fulfil this function. We 
suggest that capacity building is more reasonable in democratic than in non-
                                                     
9 Barriers to effective adaptation in SIDS include for instance access to financial, technological, and 
human resources, issues related to cultural and social acceptability of measures, and constraints im-
posed by the existing political and legal frameworks (Nurse et al., 2014). 
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democratic countries. Non-democratic countries would instead require something 
like ‘democracy building’.10 Next, we therefore defend the idea that prioritising 
democratically governed people is justified. 
4 Towards a democracy criterion 
By ‘democracy’, we refer “to a method of group decision making characterized by 
a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective deci-
sion making” (Christiano, 2015). The degree of equality can be more or less deep: 
It can represent mere formal equality, such as the one-person one-vote rule in an 
election, or a more robust form of equality, such as equality in the process of de-
liberation. It may involve either direct participation of members of society in law 
and policy making or selection of representatives (Christiano, 2015). Democracy 
does not require perfect equality, but a certain degree of equality: regarding oppor-
tunities for political participation, individual freedoms, limited influence of private 
interests over the state, and so on.  
4.1 Reasons for a democracy criterion 
In this sub-section, we offer (what may be called) intrinsic and instrumental rea-
sons in favour of a democracy criterion, starting with the former. 
From the perspective of climate ethics, people in the Global South vulnerable 
to climate change are entitled to support from the Global North in their adaptation 
efforts (for detail see Baatz, 2013, 2017). Adaptation finance is owed to the per-
sons whose rights are threatened or undermined and, once provided, it is owned 
by these people (Duus-Otterström, 2016). The human rights perspective entails 
that it is not owned by the representatives of a citizenry or the country as a collec-
tive.  
However, it does not make much sense to pay adaptation finance to individu-
als. Adaptation that effectively protects people usually must be undertaken at the 
collective level. And since the benefits of various adaptive measures are difficult to 
estimate (see above), it must be decided at the collective level where to undertake 
which projects. Thus, adaptation usually involves a considerable amount of collec-
tive decision-making. But due to citizens’ entitlement to the funding, they ought to 
participate in the collective decision-making process, ideally with an equal say. This 
does not necessarily mean that everyone whose human rights are threatened ought 
to have the opportunity to personally participate in the decision-making on how to 
spend adaptation finance, but that their interests must be appropriately represent-
ed. According to the human rights account we endorse, people threatened by cli-
mate change are not seen as helpless and speechless victims but rather as bearers 
                                                     
10 We discuss in a separate paper under development whether adaption finance should also be used in 
this regard (Bourban & Baatz, 2019). 
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of the right to voice their interests and concerns as equals in policy discourses. If 
this is not possible, opportunities for political participation ought to be created.  
In addition to this entitlement argument, the presence of democratic institu-
tions is also likely to increase the effectiveness of adaptation finance. The following 
presents two such instrumental reasons in favour of the democracy criterion.  
First, the incorporation of local knowledge in the planning of adaptation in-
creases its effectiveness. While vulnerable people will often benefit from financial, 
technical, and informational support, their knowledge and awareness are important 
for effective adaptation (Khan & Roberts, 2013, p. 183; Biagini, Bierbaum, Stults, 
Dobardzic, & McNeeley, 2014, p. 105; Heyward, 2017, p. 482). The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) even observes that support by local actors 
and community engagement constitute a prerequisite for successful adaptation 
(Mimura et al., 2014, p. 881). Otherwise, there is the risk that activities are funded 
“which suit the interests of more powerful stakeholders, but struggle to bring ben-
efits to the most vulnerable communities” (Fenton, Gallagher, Wright, Huq, & 
Nyandiga, 2014, p. 391; similarly Duus-Otterström, 2016, p. 665). There is a con-
sensus in the literature that local adaptation governance should be democratised in 
order to prioritise the predicament of the poor and the marginalised (Mikulewicz, 
2018, p. 26). Therefore, robust democratic decision-making increases the likeli-
hood that local citizens affected by adaptation can incorporate their knowledge, 
ideas, and concerns into the decision-making process on how to adapt.  
Second, democratic institutions and procedures make corruption and misuse 
of funding more difficult and these phenomena in turn undermine effective adap-
tation. As Paavola and Adger (2006, p. 606) put it: “Where democratic structures 
are absent, planning for climate change is little more than a rhetoric within a land-
scape of unsustainable development”.   
According to Transparency International (2011, xxvi), the extent to which pol-
icy development and decisions are participatory, accountable, transparent, and 
respect the rule of law will determine how serious corruption risks are. The risk is 
lower if democratic institutions ensure working checks and balances between 
branches of the government and include effective non-governmental watchdogs, 
from the media to civil society organisations and independent academic institutions 
(Vogl, 2012, p. 153). Disclosure of information and participation in decision-
making are especially crucial (Horstmann, 2011, p. 249), since they enable the gen-
eral public and entitlement-bearers to retrace inappropriate capture of resources. 
While the relationship between democracy and corruption is complex, recent 
empirical studies generally support the claim that democracy reduces corruption 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2016) but also highlight that mere formal equality in the form of 
‘one person one vote’ in regular elections is not enough: media freedom 
(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015), income to meet basic needs (Neudorfer, 2015; 
Jetter, Agudela, & Hassan, 2015), limited economic inequality (You, 2016), availa-
bility of information (Boehm, 2015), and well-functioning checks and balances 
(Boehm, 2015; Saha, Gounder, Campbell, & Su, 2014) are additional conditions for 
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democracy to curb corruption. Regarding the definition of democracy as equality 
in collective decision-making mentioned above, these results suggest that the de-
gree of equality must be sufficiently high: that is, it requires that most citizens can 
make use of certain rights and have access to information, that material inequality 
is limited, and so on. Thus, the higher the degree of equal opportunities for politi-
cal participation, the less likely is corruption and misappropriation of public fund-
ing.   
So far, our argument has linked non-democratic decision-making with corrup-
tion. We further assume that corruption hampers effective adaptation because part 
of the money is not used for adaptation at all and because it supports corrupted 
practices, possibly leading to a vicious cycle increasing both corruption and vulner-
ability (Transparency International, 2018, p. 2). In addition, corruption might also 
distort public decision-making towards the interests of those with the ability to 
bribe – and we assume that these persons are usually not those whose human 
rights are most threatened. We are not aware of empirical studies on the relation-
ship between corruption and adaptation effectiveness. However, in this respect 
adaptation finance is very similar to development aid and the literature on corrup-
tion and aid effectiveness indicates a negative correlation: While some studies sug-
gest that corruption increases desirable outcomes in certain settings, e.g. by allevi-
ating the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions (Méon & Weill, 2010), 
the bulk of recent contributions arrive at the opposite conclusion (e.g. Winters, 
2010; Lee, Yang, & Kang, 2016; Smillie, 2017). To what extent these results accu-
rately describe the corruption-effectiveness relationship and apply to the adapta-
tion context remains to be seen (and investigated), but we consider this to be plau-
sible. 
In sum, we have argued that democracy makes corruption and bad policy mak-
ing less likely (we have not argued that it safeguards against such problems). Also 
note that even if non-democratic governments allow for effective adaptation, the 
intrinsic argument that stresses the non-instrumental value of political participation 
remains valid. Citizens are to be recognised as equally worthy moral agents who 
must be allowed to speak for themselves. The misrecognition of its citizens is an 
injustice which undermines a government’s role as a legitimate trustee of adapta-
tion finance. For these reasons, the extent of democratic decision-making should 
be considered in the prioritisation of adaptation finance. 
4.2 Specifying and ‘measuring’ democracy in SIDS 
Just like vulnerability and cost-effectiveness, democracy is a complex concept. To 
be of use in the distribution of adaptation finance, the degree of democratic deci-
sion making somehow needs to be ‘measured’. And here one may expect problems 
very similar to those of measuring vulnerability and cost-effectiveness. This sub-
section offers a first, tentative discussion of one way to operationalise the criterion 
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via the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Indicators, a rather new approach to 
conceptualising and measuring democracy.  
In the 2018 V-Dem report, the authors develop what they describe as the larg-
est democracy database, with 450 indicators and indices of democracy covering 
201 countries from 1789 to 2017 by relying on the expertise of over 3,000 scholars 
and country experts (Lührmann, 2018a; Lührmann, 2018b). They define de-
mocracy according to five core elements, each of them being measured by a diffe-
rent index: the electoral principle, the liberal principle, the egalitarian principle, the 
participatory principle, and the deliberative principle.  
Following our definition of democracy and our justification of this criterion in 
the adaptation context, we focus here on the egalitarian and the participatory prin-
ciples. Without some participation in decision-making and basic equality among 
citizens, citizens cannot voice their interests and concerns as equals in policy dis-
courses (intrinsic reason) and cannot incorporate their ideas and values in the 
planning process (first instrumental reason). The lack of both aspects also makes 
corruption more likely, which will hinder planning and implementation of projects 
and programmes that protect those whose human rights are (most) at risk (second 
instrumental reason). Participation and basic equality might prevail even if national, 
regional, or local modes of decision-making in SIDS differ from those in Western 
liberal democracies. Thus, by focusing on the egalitarian and the participatory prin-
ciple, the indicators are correlated with the key ideas behind the criterion. 
The V-Dem Egalitarian Component Index measures to what extent social 
groups enjoy political participation according to their ability to make informed 
voting decisions, to express their opinions, to demonstrate, to run for office, and 
to influence policymaking. It is particularly interested in the degree of equality of 
protection of individual rights and freedoms from the state as well as the degree of 
equality in the distribution of resources to ensure that individuals can have access 
to the basic necessities enabling them to exercise their rights and freedoms (Sigman 
& Lindberg, 2015, p. 1). Each component of the index strives to capture these two 
theoretical dimensions of the egalitarian principle. Indicators used in the Equal 
Protection subcomponent include equal access to justice, social class equality in 
respect for civil liberties, and social group equality in respect for civil liberties 
(Sigman & Lindberg, 2015, p. 10). These measures reflect the extent to which 
rights and freedoms are applied equally across the population of a given country. 
Indicators used in the Equal Distribution of Resources subcomponent include 
educational equality, health equality, and the power distribution according to social 
groups and gender (Sigman & Lindberg, 2015, p. 11).  
A challenge is potential trade-offs between components within the egalitarian 
index. As Coppedge and colleagues (2018, p. 14) explain, contradictions between 
and within principles are unavoidable because of democracy’s multi-dimensional 
character. However, strong correlations among the indicators show that there are 
good grounds for the robustness of the egalitarian index. High degrees of equal 
distribution of resources and high levels of equality in participation are mutually 
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reinforcing dynamics, which suggests that the index does measure accurately the 
egalitarian principle and avoids insurmountable contradictions between its indica-
tors (Sigman & Lindberg, 2015, pp. 14–17).  
The V-Dem Participatory Component Index measures active participation by 
citizens in political processes by focusing on civil society organisations, mecha-
nisms of direct democracy and participation, as well as representation through local 
and regional governments. The index relies on three arenas of participation: the 
electoral arena, political parties, and civil society. Each arena is measured by indica-
tors from three dimensions: the institutional context, which refers to the proce-
dures and structures allowing citizens to have opportunities to participate in elec-
tions, political parties, or civil society organisations; the organisational context, 
which asks whether citizens embrace these opportunities; and the cultural dimen-
sion, which asks how citizens make use of participation. For instance, indicators 
measure the degree to which elections are free, fair, and multi-party (first arena), 
the existence of bans on political parties and the autonomy of opposition parties 
(second arena), and the freedom to join and exit civil society organisations, the 
extent to which civil society is repressed, and its role in public policy consultation 
(third arena). Here again, although the degrees of correlation vary, there are strong 
correlations among indicators, especially between participation in political parties 
and in civil society (Fernandes, Cancela, Coppedge, Lindberg, & Hicken, 2015, pp. 
21–25).  
Despite these strong correlations that contribute to the robustness of the egali-
tarian and the participatory indices, one should keep in mind that the set of indica-
tors used by V-Dem is not exhaustive. It is comprehensive, but the complex nature 
of equality and participation resists closure (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 14). 
Having introduced the V-Dem project and two of its indices, we next offer ex-
emplary results on the level of political equality and participation in selected SIDS, 
briefly discuss how decision-makers can use this information, and comment on 
limited data availability in the case of SIDS.  
Political diversity among SIDS is well illustrated by different levels of democ-
racy. The V-Dem ranking is based on a scale from 0 (very undemocratic) to 1 (very 
democratic) and there is no threshold for a country to be considered as democratic 
or undemocratic. For 2017, SIDS that ranked the highest in the egalitarian index 
were Mauritius (0.67), Cape Verde (0.65), Barbados (0.63), Trinidad and Tobago 
(0.63), and Suriname (0.62), while SIDS that ranked the lowest were Cuba (0.25), 
Dominican Republic (0.24), Maldives (0.22), and Papua New Guinea (0.22). Re-
garding the participatory index, SIDS that ranked the highest were Jamaica (0.56), 
Suriname (0.53), Mauritius (0.51), and Cape Verde (0.48), while those that ranked 
the lowest were Maldives (0.2), Fiji (0.17), Singapore (0.14), Cuba (0.07), and Bah-
rain (0.04).11   
                                                     
11 We used the “Variable graph” to generate and compare these data: https://www.v-
dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/. 
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Equality and participation correlate strongly, indicating that these two essential 
components of democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing. Countries that score 
high in the egalitarian index, such as Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Suriname, also 
score the highest in the participatory index. Likewise, countries that score low in 
the egalitarian index also tend to score low in the participatory index, as the cases 
of Maldives and Cuba illustrate. Since the levels of equality and participation have 
risen since the 1950s in Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Suriname and have kept rela-
tively constant since the 2000s (between 0.62 and 0.72 for the egalitarian index and 
between 0.48 and 0.56 for the participatory index, if we take into account all three 
countries), the V-Dem indices also show that there is a certain form of stability in 
relatively high levels of equality and participation in these countries that cannot be 
found in countries that are less democratic, such as Maldives and Cuba. 
Instead of going into further detail regarding these data, we comment on how 
to make use of the information provided by the indices in the context of adapta-
tion finance. On the one hand, with V-Dem a sophisticated and robust tool to 
measure democracy in recipient countries is available. On the other hand, contra-
dictions between and within V-Dem indices remain possible and some arbitrari-
ness in the choice of indicators cannot be fully avoided. For this reason, and not 
surprisingly, the indices should not be turned into or become part of a distributive 
formula. But we do think that this information should be considered in decisions 
regarding the distribution of funding.  
Basically, the democracy criterion can play two distinct roles in the context of 
adaptation finance: it can affect either the modality or the amount of funding pro-
vided. In the case of the former, the conditionalities attached to the funding should 
increase with a decreasing level of democracy. The fewer opportunities for political 
participation there are, the higher the need to specify and to monitor how funding 
is used. In the case of latter, funding is reduced as levels of democracy are lower or 
even withheld in the case of very undemocratic countries. This might be justifiable 
by reference to highly insufficient available funding and in cases where confidence 
is low that imposed conditionalities can safeguard effective adaptation. However, 
poor governance is a driver of vulnerability and many people that are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change are governed in non-democratic countries. Withdraw-
al of funding would mean that these people would not benefit from adaptation 
finance. There are no easy answers on how to deal with this trade-off, unfortunate-
ly, and we further investigate the matter in a separate research paper under devel-
opment (Bourban & Baatz, 2019). How this question is answered also affects 
whether level of democracy should influence the modality or the amount of fund-
ing provided, or both. Therefore, we remain agnostic here regarding which of the 
two roles the democracy criterion should play. 
One problem that V-Dem shares with many other indices is low availability of 
data. Since comprehensive data are required for measuring its components, and 
despite its broad coverage of more than 200 countries, many SIDS are not yet 
covered by V-Dem (see Table 1). This research gap should be closed as soon as 
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possible to make full use of the democracy criterion and V-Dem respectively. As 
long as the gap persists, it may be possible to draw on other indicators that have 
data for these countries, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
especially the “Voice and Accountability” and “Control of Corruption” indices 
(World Bank, 2018), that cover almost all SIDS. This can make sense if these indi-
cators exhibit strong correlations with V-Dem indices in countries covered by 
both. Also, if funding agencies have reliable information on the extent of demo-
cratic processes, they can use that information, for instance, to tie funding to addi-
tional conditionalities or provide more funding to another region/country. When 
only inconclusive data is available, the democracy criterion needs to be ignored. 
Whether and how to fund what kinds of adaptation projects in a given region, is 
then based on all other relevant considerations. For a multi-criteria, non-formulaic 
approach used by all bi- and multilateral funding agencies, such data gaps are not a 
fundamental drawback to our argument that considering democracy levels is desir-
able and in many cases possible.  
 
Table 1: V-Dem’s Coverage of SIDS: UN member SIDS are marked with an aster-
isk; SIDS eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA) are highlighted 
in italics (UNFCCC, 2018). 
Currently cov-
ered by V-Dem  
Bahrain*, Barbados*, Cape Verde*, Comoros*, Cuba*, Domini-
can Republic*, Fiji*, Guinea Bissau*, Guyana*, Haiti*, Jamaica*, 
Maldives*, Mauritius*, Papua New Guinea*, São Tomé and 
Príncipe*, Seychelles*, Singapore*, Solomon Islands*, Suriname*, 
Timor-Leste*, Trinidad and Tobago*, Vanuatu* 
Currently not 
covered by V-
Dem  
American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda*, Aruba, 
Bahamas*, Belize*, British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, 
Dominica*, Federated States of Micronesia*, French Polynesia, 
Guam, Grenada*, Kiribati*, Marshall Islands*, Montserrat, 
Nauru*, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau*, Puerto Rico, Samoa*, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis*, Saint Lucia*, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines*, Tonga*, Tuvalu*, United States Virgin Islands 
 
Finally note that operationalising democracy as understood here is less difficult 
than operationalising cost-effectiveness (and possibly even vulnerability). We ar-
gued that adaptation benefits are diverse and that avoided DALYs losses and rela-
tive income only capture certain types of benefits. Perhaps a comprehensive ap-
proach of measuring cost-effectiveness comparable to the V-Dem project might 
remedy this shortfall. However, a universal cost-effectiveness criterion entails 
comparisons of things that are difficult to compare (improvements in, say, educa-
tion, health, and ecosystems) and must rely on predictions of the (long-term) ef-
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fects of adaptation measures, which are usually marked by substantial uncertainty. 
In contrast, the democracy criterion requires no such predictions for it checks 
whether desirable conditions predominate at present. Moreover, while we 
acknowledge that participation and equality are not easy to ‘measure’, these notions 
are less heterogeneous than the concept of adaptation benefits. That is to say, a 
comprehensive operationalisation of cost-effectiveness would require collecting 
and aggregating more, and more diverse data than required for the egalitarian and 
the participatory indices. Thus, although many questions on how to operationalise 
the democracy criterion are yet to be settled, the task seems less daunting than 
operationalising the cost-effectiveness criterion and possibly even the vulnerability 
criterion.  
5 Conclusion 
International funding to support adaptation projects in SIDS is scarce. To deter-
mine who is most entitled to adaptation projects, prioritisation criteria are needed. 
The most prominent criterion, vulnerability, faces drawbacks and should be com-
plemented by further criteria. Cost-effectiveness could be such a criterion but so 
far indicators proposed to operationalise it are not suitable and/or are insufficient. 
Absolute or relative economic savings and avoided losses of DALYs do not cap-
ture important adaptation benefits and may reinforce the problematic bias towards 
hard adaptation measures. Rather than comparing adaptation benefits across pro-
jects, universal criteria and associated indicators should show whether the condi-
tions that allow for effective adaptation are present or can be facilitated via fund-
ing. The criterion of democracy highly fulfils this function because equal opportu-
nities for participating in collective decision-making increase the likelihood that 
local knowledge is incorporated into adaptation decisions and reduce the likelihood 
of corruption and misuse of funding. Moreover, such opportunities enable those 
entitled to adaptation projects to participate in making decisions about how to 
adapt, which is intrinsically valuable. In terms of the operationalisation of the crite-
rion, the V-Dem indicators – especially the egalitarian and the participatory indices 
– seem to present a viable path, although whether and to what extent this claim 
holds requires more detailed investigation. We want to start rather than close this 
debate. 
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